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Labour Markets Trends, Financial Globalization  
and the current crisis in Developing Countries
Rolph van der Hoeven1
Introduction
The current wave of globalization, starting around 1999-2000 (with the fall of the Berlin Wall, changes in 
the concepts of development and ensuing capital market liberalization following trade liberalization under-
taken earlier), had profound effects on the labour market and the employment situation of workers all over 
the world. These effects, in many cases, have been accentuated by the current financial and economic crisis. 
The purpose of this paper is first to review some general labour market trends in this period of globalization 
and second to highlight labour market trends associated with financial globalization
A major question is, of course, whether ongoing analyses of employment, inequality, and globaliza-
tion remain relevant in the current context of the large financial and economic crisis. This paper argues that 
they do, at least for the following two reasons:
First, several elements of the ongoing process of globalization, especially the unfettered markets, 
(including the labour market)2 and the growing inequality (resulting for many households indebting them-
selves in order to keep up spending on basic needs),3 have given rise to the current crisis. Therefore, the 
analysis of the structure and nature of current globalization and its impact on employment and inequality, 
as well as policy recommendations to alter current globalization processes, are even more relevant in times of 
the current crisis.
Second, there is growing evidence that the employment, human and social effects of the financial 
and economic crisis will last for a while, especially if no corrective action is taken. Reinhardt and Rogoff 
(2009), for example, foresee that the decline in gross domestic product (GDP) growth will lead to rising 
unemployment with a much longer duration than the decline in GDP growth itself. Based on a sample of 
past crises, both in the North and in the South, they observe an average slump in employment lasting 4.8 
years, compared to a decline in output growth of only 1.9 years.4 There is also evidence that indicators for 
human development exhibit a similar ratchet effect. Arbache and Page (2007), for example, shows that child 
1 I would like to thank Malte Luebker for valuable inputs, especially for sections 3.2-3, and Theo Sparreboom for 
providing data from ILO KILM data set.
2 Part of growing inequality can be explained by the policies undertaken during the process of liberalization and 
adjustment, including policies to make the labour market more efficient. See Van der Hoeven and Taylor (2000).
3 “(O)ver the past 30 years, particularly, there has been an increase in inequality. In effect, we have been transferring 
money from the poor to the rich, from people who would spend the money to people who do not need to spend 
the money, and the result of that is weaker aggregate demand. The United States thought it could solve the problem: 
Americans who had no money were told to keep spending as if they had it. They enjoyed it for a while. A massive debt 
finance bubble enabled them to continue to spend.” (Stiglitz, 2009, pp. 7-8).
4 Van der Hoeven and Luebker (2007) investigates the behaviour of labour shares in national incomes during recent 
periods of financial crises and observes a ratchet effect: labour shares decline during crises but in many cases do not 
return, once the economy has picked up, to their pre-crisis level.
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mortality in Africa increases during growth decelerations, but hardly falls during accelerations. Furthermore, 
primary school completion rates and life expectancy remain substantially lower in countries experiencing 
growth decelerations.
There are thus strong reasons to include policies for employment, income inequality and human 
development as priority issues in designing both short- and long-term policies to deal with the crisis. But, 
might there be tradeoffs between these policies for employment, income inequality and human develop-
ment? A recent study (Angeles-Castro, 2006) on explanations for growing inequality over the last decade 
concludes that high employment levels reduce inequality and, especially for developing nations, high em-
ployment levels in the industrial sector reduce inequality. Employment expansion and reduction of income 
inequality can thus be combined objectives in policymaking. In a similar vein, Stewart and Ranis (2002) 
argues that human development and economic growth can be joint and mutually reinforcing targets for 
policymaking. It thus seems more than appropriate to argue for greater attention to employment, income 
inequality and human development in times of crises.
Stiglitz (2009) argues that the dominant view during the current process of globalization was that 
unfettered markets were sufficient to ensure economic efficiency. The best role for Government was a limited 
one, and somehow the benefits of growth resulting from unfettered markets would trickle down to everyone 
in society. Added to that was the view of a dominant strand of economists that the problem in the market 
economy was rigid wages, and that if it were not for wage rigidities, the economy would work in the way 
that classical economics predicted. According to Stiglitz, the implication of the Keynesian rigid-wage theory 
was very invidious but pervasive: Get rid of the rigid wages, and let labour markets be more “flexible”. That 
has been the basis of a whole set of doctrines undermining job protections and labour rights. But as he 
rightly observes, wages are not rigid: in the Great Depression wages fell by about one third. The problem that 
Keynes had recognized was that wages can be too flexible. Stiglitz observes that lack of aggregate demand was 
the problem with the Great Depression, just as lack of aggregate demand is the problem today. Accordingly, 
imposing more wage flexibility can result in exacerbating the underlying problem of lack of aggregate de-
mand. He puts the nature of the problem that we face today as follows: “The people in the global economy 
have the same skills as before the crisis, and the machines and real resources are the same as before the crisis. 
The problem is that there is an organizational failure, a coordination failure, and a macroeconomic failure.”
Labour market trends
Before discussing the consequences of financial globalization on employment in more detail, we will present 
a longer term picture of the development of the labour markets in developing regions. We can distinguish a 
number of general labour market trends over the last two decades.
Decline in the employment-to-population rate
First is the decline in the employment-to-population rate for most regions in the world. For the world as 
a whole, the employment-to-population ratio seems to have remained rather constant, but there are im-
portant regional differences (see figure 1). All three Asian regions and sub-Saharan Africa had the highest 
employment-to-population ratio at the beginning of the 1990s, but thereafter experienced declines by several 
percentage points.
In contrast, the ratio increased slightly from much lower levels in the Middle East, North Africa 
and Latin America. The lower employment-to-population level in these regions can be explained by very 
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low female participation in the labour force at the beginning of the 1990s. At the global level, we notice two 
opposite trends, namely an increased ratio for female labour force participants and a decline of male partici-
pation (figure 2). The first trend can be ascribed to changes in customs and norms, and the second more to 
economic effects.
The changing pattern in production
The second trend is the changing pattern in production. For the world as a whole, the percentage of employ-
ment in the service industry has risen from 33.6 per cent in 1991 to 43.8 per cent in 2008. High service 
sector share in employment had already prevailed in developed countries, the Middle East, and North Africa, 
where we consequently see small increases of around 9.5, 2.5, and 2 percentage points, respectively; however, 
massive increases in this share took place in East Asia, where it almost doubled from 19.5 to 35.7 per cent, 
and in South Asia, where it increased from 23.6 to 30.1 per cent.
Some analysts interpret the increase of employment in the service industry as an indication of a 
post-industrial society and an important indicator of progress in development. But this interpretation fails 
to recognize that the service industry encompasses a wide range of activities, from hawking and peddling 
in the street to sophisticated financial services. Therefore a better indicator of development for developing 
countries is the size of the manufacturing sector. Here we notice a different trend over the last two decades. 
At the global level, the share of employment in industry has hardly changed between 1991 and 2008, 
remaining at 21.5 per cent. But there are again important regional differences. The most dramatic increase is 
in South-East Asia and the Pacific, where the share increased from 12.7 per cent in 1991 to 19.4 per cent in 
2000, and in South Asia where it increased, over the same period, from 15.4 to 22.4 per cent, thereby almost 
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Figure 1: Employment-to-population ratio, 1991-2008, various regions in the world
Source: ILO , Trends Econometric Models, July 2009.
Abbreviations: SSA, Sub-Saharan Africa; LAC, Latin America and the Caribbean; DEEU, Developed Economies and the European Union;
CSEE & CIS, Central and South Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States.
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Figure 3: Percentage of employment in services, 1991-2008, various regions in the world
Source: ILO , Trends Econometric Models, July 2009.
Abbreviations: SEAP, South-East Asia and the Pacic; CSEE & CIS, Central and South Eastern Europe (non-EU) 
and Commonwealth of Independent States.
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Figure 2: Male employment-to-population ratio, 1991-2008, various regions in the world
Source: ILO , Trends Econometric Models, July 2009.
Abbreviations: SEAP, South-East Asia and the Pacic; CSEE & CIS, Central and South Eastern Europe (non-EU) 
and Commonwealth of Independent States.
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East
World
Sub-Saharan Africa
Developed Economies
and European Union
CSEE & CIS
East Asia
North Africa
South Asia
SEAP
Labour Markets Trends, Financial Globalization ... in Developing Countries 5
reaching the share in East Asia, which has remained more or less constant over the period (around 23.5 per 
cent, with a dip of 3-4 percentage points around 1998 owing to the Asian crisis). Noticeable are the very low 
and stagnant share in sub-Saharan Africa (at around 8.5 per cent) and a declining share in North Africa.
It should be noted, however, that the share of employment in industry can lead to an underestima-
tion of the level of progress in industry. As Rada and Taylor (2006) observe, industry often has high pro-
ductivity (or a low employment-value added elasticity). An important issue is therefore not only the size of 
employment in industry but also how the surplus generated in the industrial sector is used for reinvestment 
and how it is distributed throughout the rest of the economy.
The “precarization” (casualization) of labour
A third noticeable trend over the last 20 years is the “precarization” (casualization) of labour, or the increase 
of non-standard forms of employment. Contrary to what has been argued by some, this is not only the case 
for workers in developing countries, but applies equally for workers in developed countries. Precarization 
of workers in developed countries is manifest by changes in employment status, replacement of traditional 
labour contracts by outsourcing contracts, more flexible work arrangements, an increase in part-time work, 
etc. In developing countries, the precariousness is most clearly manifest in the existence of a pervasive 
“informal sector” in the economy or the “informal economy”.5 This phenomenon is not restricted to poor 
developing countries, as figure 5 shows.
5 It has become common to speak about the “informal economy” rather than the “informal sector” as, increasingly, 
informal activities take place within established enterprises. It would thus be a misnomer to continue to speak about 
the informal sector. 
Figure 4: Percentage of employment in industry, 1991-2008, various regions in the world
Source: ILO , Trends Econometric Models, July 2009.
Abbreviations: CSEE & CIS, Central and South Eastern Europe (non-EU) and Commonwealth of Independent States;
DEEU, Developed Economies and European Union.
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The existence of the informal economy is partly related to the changes in the structure of employ-
ment: Especially for the poorer regions, the increase of employment in the service sector reflects an increase 
in the share of workers engaged in informal activities. Figure 6, obtained from a recent OECD publication, 
clearly indicates this pervasiveness of the informal sector in Latin America and South-East Asia. Despite 
increases in per capita income in these regions, quite substantial in the case of Asia, the size of the informal 
sector has increased, rather than declined.
Figure 7 shows that, despite the limited data available, we can nevertheless infer for all developing 
regions in the world an increase in the absolute number of workers employed in the informal sector; for two 
out of three regions, the relative share of informal workers in total employment has also increased.
There are, however contradictory explanations of the pervasiveness of the informal sector. Some (for 
example, Maloney, 2004) argue that the size of the informal sector is determined by the degree of labour 
market inflexibility. According to them, the more inflexible the labour market, the greater the avoidance of 
employers and workers to act in an informal manner. Others (for example, Kucera, 2008) argue that the ma-
jor cause of informal sector activities is the lack of formal jobs. This interpretation has gained ground in the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and other United Nations organizations.
There is evidence of a clear link between the increase in non-standard work and income inequality 
(Rani, 2008), mainly owing to widening wage differentials between standard and non-standard jobs. Some 
would explain this by the low education level of those engaged in the informal sector, which is borne out by 
Figure 5: Informality and economic development
(average rate of informal employment, in percentage)
Source: ILO, Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries, 2009.
Note: The graph plots deciles of GDP per capita levels (in PPP) against the average size of the informal sector in the informal employment
database used for this report.
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Figure 6: Informal employment and GDP in Latin America and South-East Asia
Source: UNDP, Poverty in Focus, Jobs,  Jobs, Jobs, The Policy Challenge, 2008.
 
Figure 7: Informal employment in different regions, 1990s–2000s
(relative to total employment, in percentage)
Source: ILO, Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries, 2009.
Note: Country groupings: (i) Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
(ii) Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand; (iii) Africa: Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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statistics. But it is most likely the type of job rather than educational attainment which drives inequality. An 
increase in education levels will result in better educated workers in the informal economy without a major 
decline in wage inequality in the absence of newly created formal jobs.
Declining wage share and growing wage inequality
A fourth trend, which is partly related to changing sectoral patterns and informalization of employment, is 
the declining wage share and the growing wage inequality seen in several regions around the world.
ILO (2008) reports that the wage share declined over the period 1995-2007 in two thirds of the 
developing countries, including the major ones. The only exception was the Latin American region, where 
some countries witnessed an increasing wage share. The ILO report attributes the declining wage share to 
increasing trade and globalization and confirms earlier research findings (see Diwan, 2001 and Harrison, 
2002) that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that sees the labour share in GDP as being relatively 
constant, the proportion of GDP that goes into wages and other labour income is variable over time. Using a 
data set from 1960 to 1997, Harrison (2002) splits her sample (of over 100 countries) into two even groups 
(based on 1985 GDP per capita). Her data show that, in the group of poorer countries, labour’s share in 
national income fell on average by 0.1 percentage points per year from 1960 to 1993. The decline in the 
labour share accelerated af ter 1993, to an average decline of 0.3 percentage points per year. In the richer 
sub-group, the labour share grew by 0.2 per centage points prior to 1993, but fell by 0.4 percentage points 
per year thereafter. Thus there was a trend reversal for richer countries after 1993, and an acceleration of an 
already downward trend for the poorer sub-group.
Harrison (2002) tested for factors that could explain changes in labour shares, combining detailed 
national accounts data from the United Nations with measures of trade openness, capital account restrictions 
and capital flows. Overall, the results suggest that changes in factor shares are primarily linked with changes 
in capital/labour ratios. However, measures of globalization (such as capital controls or direct investment 
flows) also play a role. Harrison found that exchange rate crises lead to declining labour shares, suggest-
ing that labour pays a dispropor tionately high price when there are large swings in exchange rates (that is, 
wages are more severely affected than GDP). Capital controls are associ ated with an increase in the labour 
share, an effect that Harrison attributes to the weaker bargaining position of capital vis-à-vis labour, if the 
cost of relocating production increases with capital con trol. Foreign investment inflows are also as sociated 
with a fall in the labour share. The weak bargaining position of labour under open capital accounts is also a 
causal mechanism explored by Lee and Jayadev (2005). They find that financial openness exerts a downward 
pressure on the labour share both in developed and developing countries for the period from 1973 to 1995. 
Harrison also finds that increasing trade is associated with a fall in the labour share. This result is robust 
across specifications. The above findings point to a systematic negative relationship between various measures 
of globalization and labour’s share in GDP.
Diwan (2001) reports, based on a large sample of countries, an average drop in the labour share 
of GDP per crisis of 5.0 percentage points, and a modest catch-up thereafter. In the three years after the 
crisis, labour shares were still 2.6 percentage points below their pre-crisis average. Given the fact that most 
countries have undergone more than one crisis, the cumulative drop in the wage share over the last 30 years 
is estimated at 4.1 per cent of GDP, and is especially large for Latin America, where the share dropped by 6.7 
per cent between the 1970s and the 1990s. The overall decline in the labour share is partly explained by what 
some call the ratchet effect: After an economic shock or a financial crisis, the labour share in gross national 
income (GNI) decreases (van der Hoeven and Saget, 2004).
Labour Markets Trends, Financial Globalization ... in Developing Countries 9
Figure 8: Changes in wage share in various countries, 1995-2007
Source: ILO, Global Wage Report 2008/9.
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Figure 9: Changes in wage inequality between top and bottom wage earners in various countries since 1995
Source: ILO, Global Wage Report 2008/9.
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However, not only has the inequality between wages and other components of GDP increased but 
the distribution among wage earners has worsened. The ratio of the average wage of the top 10 per cent of 
wage earners (in relation to the bottom 10 per cent) is found to have increased in 70 per cent of the coun-
tries. Here, too, similar regional differences are observed—an almost uniform pattern for most regions, but 
mixed for Latin America.
The internationalization of the production process
A fifth noticeable trend over the last two decades has been the internationalization of the production process. 
Today, there are some 82,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) with 810,000 affiliates in the world. These 
companies play a major role in the world economy. For instance, exports from foreign affiliates of TNCs are 
estimated to have grown from about one quarter of total world exports of goods and services in 1982 to one 
third in 2007. And the number of people employed by these corporations has increased fourfold since 1982, 
standing at about 77 million in 2008, and implying a much faster rate of growth than that of the labour 
force. These TNCs are dominated by a smaller number of large firms. The largest 100 TNCs account for 
11 per cent of total employment by TNCs and for about 4 per cent of world GDP. Over the last 15 years, 
the largest TNCs have undergone a rapid process of internationalization. There has also been a progressive 
increase in the proportion of companies operating in the service sector and of firms based in developing 
countries.6
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009, p. 17-18.
Figure 10: Annual growth of employment, value added and exports by transnational enterprises, 1986-2007
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009, table 1.6.
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International migration
A sixth noticeable trend is international migration. Global figures for migration do not show a substantial 
change: In 1960, the stock of total migrants in the world population was 2.7 per cent, and in 2005 this 
percentage had not changed.7 This has led some commentators to argue that globalization is characterized by 
increased capital flows and increased flows in trade and services, but not by increased labour flows. However 
this characterization is misleading. An examination of more disaggregated figures (by region) clearly shows 
a growing trend in some regions. In Europe, the stock of migrants as part of the population increased from 
3.0 per cent in 1960 to 8.8 per cent in 2005. The same ratio increased from 6.7 to 13.6 per cent in Northern 
America, from 13.5 to 16.4 per cent in Oceania, and from 4.9 to 37.1 per cent in the Gulf States. By 
contrast, the ratio of the stock of migrants to the local population declined in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
as a whole. The increase in the share of migrants in the local population in developed countries is quite 
substantial, despite the severe restriction most of these countries have put on inward migration.
This increased level of migration is leading to tensions in countries of destination but is provid-
ing an increasing source of foreign exchange for the sending countries. Figure 12 indicates that for many 
developing countries remittances represent a much larger flow than development assistance. For example, 
in East Asia and the Pacific in 2007, in per capita terms, remittances stood at $34 per capita compared with 
$5 for official development assistance (ODA) flows. Analogous figures for Latin America and the Caribbean 
are $114 and $10, and for South Asia, $33 and $6. Only in sub-Saharan Africa was the per capita inflow of 
remittances ($26) lower than that of ODA ($39).
7 This figure excludes the former Soviet Union as after the independence of the former Soviet republics, remaining Soviet 
citizens are counted as migrants. 
Figure 11: Migrants as a percentage of population, 1960 and 2005
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, Statistical annex table 1.
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Using a broad definition, the World Bank estimates that remittances to developing countries 
amounted to $166.9 billion in 2005, compared to $85.6 billion in 2000 and $31.2 billion in 1990 (World 
Bank, 2005a, p. 88). Remittances are not only a rapidly growing source of external finance, but they are 
generally steady across years and not prone to sud den reversals of direction (Ratha, 2005). They tend to be 
counter- cyclical to crises in developing countries (that is, migrants send more money home to support their 
families) and hence help to smooth consumption volatility. However, the current financial and economic 
crisis engendered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States is leading to greater job losses than 
ever, in particular in industries such as construction that have a disproportionate share of migrant workers. 
This is creating the possibility of an adverse impact on remittances.
The six labour market trends described above—the declining employment-to-population ratio; the 
increase in service employment; the continuing high share of workers in the informal economy; the declining 
wage share and increasing income inequality; the growing importance of multinational enterprises; and the 
growing number of migrant workers in industrialized countries—give a general picture of increased “pre-
carization” of many workers and their families, resulting in part from the ongoing process of globalization, 
including financial globalization. Freeman (2004) even argues that financial globalization affects employment 
and incomes of workers in developing countries more than trade liberalization does.
The next section therefore reviews in more detail the consequences of financial globalization, includ-
ing its consequences for labour.
Figure 12: Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees 
as a percentage of GDP, various regions, 1988-2007
Source: World Bank, 2009, World Development Indicators 2009.
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Financial globalization and labour
Introduction
The current wave of globalization is characterized by the widespread adoption of policies for financial 
openness.8 Over the past two decades, many countries have liber alized their capital accounts (see Lee and 
Jayadev, 2005) and al most all policy meas ures related to foreign direct invest ment (FDI) favoured a more 
open regime. These measures have been adopted autonomously by some countries, including as conditions 
for loans’ adjustment. The major expected result from fi nancial openness was that it would allow developing 
countries to better utilize resources and to increase capital forma tion by stimulating FDI and other interna-
tional capital flows, such as private portfolio investment. A more open national financial system was seen as a 
necessary complement to the lifting of im pediments to international capital flows.
Capital has become more globally mobile as a result of these policy changes, especially since the 
mid-1990s. Worldwide, gross private capital flows (the sum of the absolute values of FDI, port folio invest-
ment and other investment inflows and outflows) have exceeded 20 per cent of world GDP every year since 
1998 and reached a new record of 32.3 per cent of GDP in 2005— compared to less than 10 per cent of 
world GDP before 1990. Global FDI flows, a sub-category of private capital flows, also rose substan tially 
during the 1990s. They peaked at 4.9 per cent of world GDP in 2000 and declined with the downturn of 
the early 2000s, but strongly rebounded before the current global financial and economic crisis. On average, 
global FDI flows doubled between the 1980s and the 1990s, and again in the years from 2000 to 2007.
In spite of this substantial increase in capital flows, the expected benefits have not materialized 
for many countries. During the surge in foreign capital flows since the mid-1990s, actual investment into 
new infrastructure and productive capacity stagnated. This can, in part, be attributed to the fact that much 
of FDI was spent on mergers and acquisitions (M&As), rather than on investment into new factories or 
equipment that would have added productive capacity.9 Gross fixed capital forma tion (the most commonly 
used measure for physical investment) averaged 21.6 per cent of GDP in the 1990s and 21.0 per cent in the 
years from 2000 to 2006. Hence, it fell well short of the level reached in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, figure 
13 below shows an overall declining trend in capital formation since the early 1970s. It is thus not surpris-
ing that, likewise, world GDP growth was slower in the 1990s and the 2000s than in previ ous dec ades (see 
figure 14 below).
Moreover, despite much excitement about the promise of “emerging markets”, cross-border capital 
flows are still largely a phenomenon of developed countries. In 2005, gross private capi tal flows equalled 
37.2 per cent of GDP in high-income countries, but only 12.7 per cent of GDP in low- and middle-income 
countries (World Bank, 2009a). While there was a positive balance between inflows and outflows for de-
veloping countries as a group, these flows have by and large bypassed the poorest countries since the early 
1990s, as middle-income countries accounted for more than 90 per cent of the total. FDI is also highly 
concen trated among industrialized countries and a small group of middle-income countries. Low-income 
8 Financial openness is used here as an umbrella term that includes both financial integration and financial liberalization. 
Financial liberalization, in turn, incorporates measures that effectively result in capital account liberalization. Included 
in financial openness are other elements such as reduced or different supervision and regulation of the banking sector 
and often a liberalization of the foreign exchange rate regime. For the standard presentation of balance of payments, see 
IMF (2004). 
9 UNCTAD data show that the FDI boom was in part driven by M&As. In 2007, the value of worldwide M&As was 
US$ 1,637 billion—some 21 per cent higher than during its previous peak in 2000. This compares to global FDI 
inflows of US$ 1,833 billion in the same year. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008. 
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Figure 13: FDI and investment as share of GDP, world, 1970-2007
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online database, as of May 2009.
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countries, to a large extent, still draw their for eign resources from remittances and ODA, which decreased 
over the 1990s and have only rebounded in the past few years.10
Meanwhile, international capital movements and their sometimes sharp reversals have led to greater 
economic volatility, a trend that has been well documented (Diwan, 2001; Prasad and others, 2003 and 2004; 
Cerra and Saxena, 2005). This vola tility has led to more frequent financial and economic crises, predominant-
ly in developing coun tries (see Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2001; Singh, 2003). While the current financial 
crisis had its origins in the industrialized world, the initial hope that developing countries had effectively “de-
coupled” proved to be an illusion when the upheaval in capital markets and the economic downturn spread 
around the globe in a matter of months. Such crises have negative effects on growth, investment and incomes, 
not only in the short term, but also in the long run (Diwan, 1999 and 2001; Cerra and Saxena, 2005).
How does financial openness affect labour? The potential direct positive effect of capital flows on 
growth is manifest as countries gain additional resources that can be invested. However, there can also be 
an indi rect negative effect on growth when financial liberalization forces countries to hold larger foreign 
reserves, thereby reducing consumption and/or investment and, hence, growth potential. If financial flows 
have, on balance, a positive impact on growth, this would be generally beneficial for labour, while slow 
growth is usually disadvantageous for labour. However, even in the case of fast or steady growth, the distribu-
tional impact of financial openness on different categories of labour needs to be taken into account. Labour 
might benefit less than is nec essary for long-term institutional and human capital development and for 
growth of domestic consumption.
Financial globalization, growth and employment
It has proven difficult to establish a robust causal rela tionship between financial globalization and growth.11 
A recent study by IMF researchers (Prasad and others, 2004) has confirmed the main findings of earlier stud-
ies, such as those undertaken by UNCTAD (2001), which finds that growth depends more on the quality of 
domestic institutions and careful macroeconomic man agement than on financial liberalization. Edison and 
others (2004) argue in the same vein and demonstrate that the findings of previous research (which found a 
positive association between capital account openness and growth) crucially depended on the country cover-
age, the choice of time periods and the indicator for capital account openness. They also find evidence for 
a suggestion that was first made by Rodrik (1998), namely that conventional indicators for capital account 
open ness closely proxy the reputation of a country’s government. If governance is con trolled, capital account 
openness has no significant effect on economic performance (Edison and others, 2004).
10 ODA and official aid to all low- and middle-income coun tries actually declined through most of the 1990s, falling 
from US$ 63.7 billion in current US dollars in 1991 to a low of US$ 51.7 billion in 1997. The recovery thereafter 
brought levels back to US$ 64.7 billion in 2002 and to US$ 105.1 billion in 2007. However, the increase is far smaller 
when adjusted for inflation. While it amounted to 1.7 per cent of GNI in recipient countries in 1991, the ratio fell to 
0.7 per cent in 2007. See World Bank, 2009a, based on series “Official development assistance and official aid (current 
US dollars)” and “Aid (percentage of GNI)”.
11 The conflicting results could in part be caused by differences in country coverage, but also by differences between the 
indicators employed in the literature. There is a crucial difference between “de jure” or “de facto” measures of financial 
openness. “De jure” openness includes abolishment or changes in rules and regulations concerning foreign capital, as 
it is often required as part of the condi tionality for financial support by the international financial institutions. Many 
countries in Latin America fall under this category. By contrast, “de facto” openness relates to increases in a financial 
open ness indicator, irrespective of whether rules have changed or not (India, China and some other Asian countries fall 
into this cate gory). In the latter case, the causal relation ship between financial openness and growth is more difficult 
to establish. Did openness lead to higher growth, or did higher growth induce financial flows and integration? Rodrik 
(2003) and Singh (2003) argue that the latter is the case, es pecially for India and China where growth induced greater 
financial integration.
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Indirect growth effects through increased reserve holdings
The financial crises of recent years have led many developing countries to build up foreign reserves. For some 
countries these reserves were created through a surplus on the current account, while others built up re serves 
through capital inflows which were not spent on foreign goods. Rodrik (2006) estimates the cost of increased 
reserve holdings to be 1 per cent of GDP, on average, for developing coun tries. While imposing costs on 
developing countries, increased reserve holdings are an indirect subsidy to the countries in whose currencies 
the reserves are held (see Stiglitz, 2000).
The trend has accelerated in recent years to a somewhat alarming level (see figure 15). Overall, 
reserves held by low- and middle-income countries were equal to 27.1 per cent of their GNI in 2007, com-
pared to 6.8 per cent in the first half of the 1990s—a fourfold increase.12 The increase took place in low- and 
middle-income developing countries alike, and across regions. Even a poor region like sub-Saharan Africa now 
holds foreign reserves equal to 17.9 per cent of its GNI, more than three times the ratio in the early 1990s. 
The trend is particularly strong in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific. Even when China (the developing 
country with the largest foreign reserves) is excluded, there remains a substantial increase from an already high 
15.0 per cent of GNI (1990-1994) to 27.6 per cent in 2007 for the rest of the region.
Financial globalization, volatility, crises and employment
Financial liberali zation in developing countries is associated with in creased GDP volatility and higher 
consumption volatility (Prasad and others, 2004; Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003; Levchenko, 2005). 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) pointed out that the absence of sound financial regula tion, both at the 
12 By contrast, foreign reserves have remained at under 5 per cent of GDP in industrialized countries (Rodrik, 2006.
Figure 15: Reserve holdings by developing countries, 1970-2007
(percentage of GNI)
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, online database (as of May 2009), based on series “International Reserves (US dollars)” 
and “Gross National Income (US dollars)”.
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national and international levels, makes developing countries much more vulnerable to negative impacts of 
capital flows. When institutions with the ability to man age greater volatility are absent or not fully effective, 
the generally pro-cyclical nature of international capital flows (the “when it rains, it pours” syn drome) adds 
to the effects of fiscal policies, and, to a certain extent, also macroeconomic policies, which tend to be pro-
cyclical in most developing countries. Such behav iour deepens and prolongs a crisis.
Financial crises typically have a large impact on the real economy. Among the countries most 
affected by the East Asian crisis of 1997/98, GDP per capita fell between 2.6 per cent (Philippines) and 
14.8 per cent (Indonesia). In Latin America, the Mexi can crisis of 1994/95 led to a decline in incomes by 
7.9 per cent, and the Argentinean cri sis of 2001/02 reduced the country’s per capita income by 16.5 per 
cent. A recent study by Hutchison and Noy (2006) docu ments that so-called “sudden stop” crises (a reversal 
in capital flows and a si multaneous currency crisis) have a particularly harmful effect on output—over and 
above that of “normal” currency crises. On average, they cause a cumulative out put loss of 13 to 15 per cent 
of GDP over a three-year period.
The view that crises pose only a temporary setback is challenged by Cerra and Saxena (2005), who 
decon struct what they call the “myth of recovery” by using panel data for broad data sets of countries. They 
document that recessions are typically not followed by high-growth recov ery phases, either immediately 
following the trough, over several years of the subse quent expansion, or even over the complete subsequent 
expansion that follows a reces sion (figure 16). When output drops, it tends to remain well below its previ ous 
trend. Cerra and Saxena also find that frequent crises and instabilities interfere with the convergence between 
rich and poor countries:
Figure 16: Typical growth path after a financial crisis in rich and poor countries
Source: Cerra and Saxena (2005).
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“Countries that experience many negative shocks to output tend to get left behind and their 
long-term growth suffers. Thus, while stan dard growth theory may work well in explaining 
expansion, a fruitful direction for future re search would be to explain the proclivity to wars, 
crises, and other negative shocks.” (Cerra and Saxena, 2005)13
Financial crises generally provoke both economic decline and social costs. These are most promi-
nently felt in terms of rising open unemployment, falling employment-to-population ratios, falling real 
wages, or a combination of the above (see, for example, Lee 1998). Moreover, the social costs are usually felt 
longer than the economic impact: even when GDP per capita has recovered to pre-crisis levels, the other 
indicators usually lag behind (see World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004). This 
pattern can be observed in a majority of countries that were most affected by the financial crises of the past 
decade. We compare the situation before to that after a financial crisis for some of the most salient examples.
Impact of financial crises on employment in Latin America and Turkey
Latin American countries have experienced several periods of financial turbulence in recent years. The most 
prominent examples are the Mexican “Tequila crisis” during 1994/95 and the currency crisis in several South 
American countries in the aftermath of the East Asian and Russian crises. Following extensive liberalization 
policies in Mexico, financial inflows expanded rapidly in the early 1990s, but reversed in 1994. The peso 
devaluation of December 1994 (see Ibarra, 1999) brought the recently privatized, al ready fragile banking 
system into considerable difficulty as the peso value of foreign de nominated debt soared. Similarly, the 
balance-sheet positions of companies which had accumulated debt in United States dollars deteriorated 
rapidly (see Carstens and Schwartz, 1998; Mishkin, 1999), which in turn led to a sharp fall in investment 
(Aguiar, 2005). Taken together, this can explain how a currency crisis rapidly turned into a crisis of the real 
economy and provoked a recession with an 8 per cent drop in per cap ita income in 1995. Unemployment, 
relatively stable at around 3 per cent before the crisis, started to increase during 1994 and reached 5.8 per 
cent in 1995, almost twice the pre-crisis rate. However, these figures mask the actual loss of jobs, since the 
share of informal employment rose from 30 per cent in 1993 to 35 per cent in 1995 (ILO, 2005). By 1997 
Mexico had achieved its pre-crisis income level, with the unemployment rate lagging the economic recovery 
by one year. However the share of informal employment remained above its pre-crisis level.
Brazil experi enced large foreign capital inflows from 1994 onwards, when the Real Plan had in-
troduced a new stable currency (see Cinquetti, 2000). When investor sentiment swung suddenly after the 
Russian debt default of August 1998, Brazil responded by tightening its monetary policy in an effort to 
defend the exchange rate. Even though interest rates reached 40 per cent in late 1998, the capital outflows 
from Brazil were massive and the Central Bank allowed the real to de value. The currency crisis, in combina-
tion with the recessionary impact of high real interest rates, led to a relatively modest decline of per capita 
income that was accompanied by an increase in unemployment from 7.7 per cent in 1997 to 9.6 per cent in 
1999 (see figure 17). Despite the subsequent eco nomic recovery, unemploy ment rates have hardly recov ered, 
and remained close to 9 per cent in 2004.
Like other emerging economies, Chile received large international capital inflows in the beginning 
of the 1990s. But unlike most other countries, Chile imposed con trols on capital inflows in the form of 
13 This is related to the point Rodrik (2003) makes, namely that policies for stimulating growth are different from policies 
to sustain growth and that frequent crises require fre quent policy regime switches. 
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an 
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR).14 Al though it is uncertain whether this affected the overall 
amount of inflows, it did reduce speculative capital inflows: the share of short-term debt in total ex ternal 
debt fell from an already low level of 19.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.8 per cent in 1997—at a time when other 
countries increasingly relied on short-term financing (de Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés, 2000). At the onset 
of the Asian crisis, Chile was thus considerably less exposed to international volatility. The peso was also at 
the lower (appreciated) end of the exchange rate band at the time, leaving room for a relatively large devalu-
ation within the band. However, the Central Bank feared that a depreciation could endanger the inflation 
target. Therefore, it defended the peso against growing pressure with a mix of monetary tighten ing and 
interventions on the foreign exchange market, before finally allowing the peso to float in September 1999 
(Morandé and Tapia, 2002).
Solimano and Larraín (2002) argue that the Central Bank effectively prioritized “[l]ower inflation 
over higher growth and employment”. The high interest rates had a recessionary impact, and unemployment 
increased from 5.3 per cent in 1997 to 8.9 per cent in 1999. While GDP per capita regained its 1998 level 
14 The unremunerated reserve requirement was introduced in June 1991 and was in effect until June 1998. It acted like 
a tax on inflows and allowed for a differential between world interest rates and those in Chile, while keeping inflows 
under control (see de Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés, 2000).
Figure 17: Medium-term effects of financial crises on unemployment in several Latin American Countries
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online database as of May 2009, series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 US 
dollars)”; ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th edition (2009).
Note: Unemployment data for Brazil exclude the rural population of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá. 
Unemployment data for Argentina refer to Greater Buenos Aires (SIAL series) or to 28 urban agglomerations (LABORSTA series).
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in 2000, unemploy ment fell only slowly and reached 6.0 per cent only in 2006. Solimano and Larraín (ibid.) 
discuss several hypotheses that could explain the sluggish employment per formance, among them firm 
restructuring, continued job losses in small and medium en terprises (SMEs) and the noticeably slower rate 
of GDP growth after the crisis. They warn that unemployment could become a structural problem in Chile 
unless capital forma tion accelerates (ibid.).
The case of Argentina stands out, for the country went through two financial crises: in 1995, when 
investors withdrew capital following the Tequila crisis in Mexico, and again in 2001/02, leading to the col-
lapse of a fixed exchange rate system (see Daseking and others, 2004). The first crisis caused only a relatively 
mild downturn, and, with considerable foreign support, pre-crisis income levels were again reached in 
1996 (see Damill, Frankel and Maurizio, 2002). As in other countries, the unemployment rate (that cov-
ers only urban areas, in the case of Argentina) was still far above the pre-crisis level at this point, but it was 
ap proaching its 1994 level by 1998.15 A recession in 1998 sent unem ployment rates rising again. Argentina 
therefore went into the 2001/02 crisis with an already high level of (urban) un employment (15.0 per cent in 
2000), that rose to almost 20 per cent by 2002. More recent data indicate that a partial recovery had oc-
curred by 2006, when unemployment fell below 10 per cent for the first time. Eco nomic turbulence and the 
cumulative eff ects of two finan cial cri ses have thus caused a substantial un employment prob lem in a country 
where un employment rates had fluctu ated around 5 per cent for most of the 1980s (ILO, 2005).
In Turkey, the frequency of crises was even higher than in Argentina. The country had liberalized its 
economy throughout the 1980s, but embarked on full capital account liberalization only in August 1989. 
Since then, capital flows have been highly volatile and have contributed to the repeated crises that aff ected 
the country in 1994, 1998/99 and 2001. As Demir (2004) argues, the country went into a vicious cycle of 
cri ses, where the loss in out put reduced public reve nues and in creased public borrowing through short-term 
treasury bills that were bought by domestic banks, which refi nanced themselves through short-term loans 
from abroad—building up currency risks and setting the stage for the next cri sis. Resulting high real inter est 
rates reduced invest ment and prospects for long-term growth (see also Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). Whereas 
recovery from the first cri sis in 1994 was relatively smooth, both in terms of GDP and employment, the 
second and especially the third cri sis proved to be more severe. Their combined effect meant that per capita 
incomes were still at their 1997/98 levels in 2003 (see figure 18). Unemployment peaked briefly dur ing 1999 
and was back at its previous level of around 6.5 per cent in 2000—before the next cri sis set in. The third 
crisis led to a dramatic rise in unemployment to 10.4 per cent in 2002 and has remained close to 10 per cent 
since. While employment had recovered largely in line with GDP during the first crises, unemployment has 
not fallen significantly after the last, most severe crisis—despite a strong rebound in GDP.
The employment impact of the East Asian crisis
That financial crises typically translate into crises of the real economy is also clearly evi dent from the experi-
ence of East Asia. In a survey of firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Thailand, entrepreneurs 
list the drop in domestic demand, the rising costs for imported inputs and the high interest rates as the 
most important reasons for the drop in both output and capacity utilization during the 1997/98 crisis 
(see Dwor-Frécaut, Colaco and Hallward-Driemeier, 2000). The declin ing capacity utilization had adverse 
impacts on the average profitability and liquidity of firms, and many companies abandoned or scaled down 
planned investments (ibid.). Interest rate and currency shocks also forced many companies into bank ruptcy 
as they found themselves unable to service their debt, much of which was denominated in foreign currency 
15 Unfortunately, due to the expansion of geographical coverage from Greater Buenos Aires (until 1995) to 28 urban 
agglomerations (from 1996 onwards) the unemployment data are not directly comparable.
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(Kawai, Lieberman and Mako, 2000). Data from the countries most severely affected by the East Asian 
crisis show that many of the surviving firms reduced their workforce in 1998, while only a small frac tion 
hired more staff (see Dwor-Frécaut, Colaco and Hallward-Driemeier, 2000). Unem ployment increased 
throughout the region, and incomes fell, in some cases dramatically, pushing many people below the poverty 
line. According to ILO estimates, the number of work ing poor in South-East Asia (using the threshold of 
1 US dollar per day) rose from its pre-crisis level of 33.7 million in 1996 to 50.6 million at the height of the 
financial crisis in 1998—an increase of almost 17 million (see Kapsos, 2004).
A more detailed look at the country level shows that in 1996, the year before the East Asian fi nan-
cial crisis, some countries had virtually achieved full em ploy ment, with unemployment rates of 1.1 per cent 
in Thailand, 2.0 per cent in the Republic of Korea and 2.5 per cent in Malaysia (figure 19). By 1998, the 
combination of production cutbacks and layoffs through bank ruptcies had brought unemployment to 3.4 
per cent in Thailand, or 1.1 million (up from 0.3 mil lion). In addition, about 0.2 million workers left the 
labour force despite strong growth of the working age population.16 Many workers had to find a new source 
of income in the informal economy which had grown sig nificantly during the crisis. This develop ment is 
mirrored by a rise in the number of self-employed by 0.8 million. Hidden unem ployment in the form of 
underemployment also increased almost twofold (from 2.3 mil lion to 4.4 million). A further effect of the 
crisis was a decline in real wages by 4 per cent within one year (see Mahmood and Aryah, 2001).17
16 See ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour market, 5th edition (2009).
17 Women in urban areas suffered a disproportionate wage loss (-10.5 per cent), and workers in manu facturing (-13 per 
cent) and constriction (-24 per cent) were also badly affected (Mahmood and Aryah, 2001).
Figure 18:  Medium-term effects of the financial crises on unemployment in Turkey
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online database as of May 2009, series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars)”; 
ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th edition (2009).
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The labour market in the Republic of Korea suffered severely from the wave of redundancies that 
accompa nied the bankruptcies of thirteen large conglomerates during 1997, and the reduction in the work force 
of the surviving companies. Delays in payments by the large cor porations dragged many SMEs into the cri sis; 
8,200 of them failed in 1997 and a further 10,500 in 1998 (see Kawai, Lieberman and Mako, 2000). Open 
unemploy ment rose to 7.0 per cent or 1.5 million (up from 0.6 million), a level not seen in decades. Among the 
hard est-hit groups were manual production workers and those in clerical grades. By the first quarter of 1999, 
total employment had fallen to 19 million, down by 2.1 million from the fourth quarter of 1997 (see Kang and 
others, 2001). The dis parity between the growth in unemployment and the far larger decline in employment 
can be attributed to the fact that around 350,000 workers (in particular women) left the labour force alto gether, 
resulting in a decline of the labour force participation rate by almost 2 percentage points (ILO, 2009a).
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online 
database as of May 2009, series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 
US dollars)”; ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th 
edition (2009).
Note: For the Philippines, unemployment data from 2005 
onwards are not comparable to earlier figures due to a series 
break.
Figure 19: Medium-term effects of the East Asian financial crises on unemployment
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The increase in unemployment was less dramatic in Malaysia, where the rate rose by less than 1 
percentage point. Nonetheless, around 250,000 formal sector jobs were lost in 1998 (see Jomo, 2001). Many 
of the retrenched workers were foreign migrant workers, which cushioned the effect on the domestic labour 
market (see Mansor and others, 2001) but dispersed some of the negative impact to other countries. ILO 
data also show that agricultural employment expanded by 135,000 in 1998. The ab sorption of labour by the 
primary sector helped to contain the rise in open un employment, but contributed to falling labour produc-
tivity in agriculture (ILO, 2009a; World Bank, 2009a).
Indonesia, with 4.4 percent unemployment in 1996, and the Philippines, with 7.4 percent, went 
into the financial crisis with considerably higher unemployment. From that higher base, about 2.5 million 
workers lost their jobs in Indonesia in 1997/1998, among them 1 million in manufacturing alone (see Islam 
and others, 2001). The fall in industry and services em ployment was offset by an expansion of agri culture 
employment, so that open unem ploy ment grew only modestly during 1998 despite strong labour force 
growth. However, unemployment continued to rise in subsequent years and reached 11.2 per cent in 2005. 
Real earnings also fell by about 40 per cent during the crisis and were still about 10 per cent below their pre-
crisis level in 2000 (Dhanani and Islam, 2004). In the Philippines, where the crisis had a comparatively mild 
economic impact, unemploy ment rose to 9.4 per cent in 1998 (+2 percentage points) and has, much like in 
Indonesia, continued on an upward path during the early 2000s.18
The East Asian experience shows that progress in returning to pre-crisis un employ ment is gener-
ally far slower than the pace of economic recovery. Although all five countries returned to positive growth 
in 1999 or 2000, unemployment rates continued to increase in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and the 
Republic of Korea and peaked only four or five years after the return to positive growth. This shows that the 
recovery of the labour market lagged far behind the economic recovery. Although all four countries have re-
gained their pre-crisis GDP level—the Republic of Korea as early as 1999 and Indonesia in 2005—Thailand 
returned to pre-crisis levels of unemployment only in 2007, a decade after the East Asian Crisis.19 Thus, 
while countries have largely managed to recover from the economic impact of the crisis, the devastating 
labour market effect seems to be much more long-lived.
Financial globalization and labour: main findings
On balance, the capital account liberalization that many developing countries embarked upon in the 1990s 
has delivered disappointing results.20
The preceding discussion has shown that capital account liberalization not only fell far short of 
expectations, but did serious harm to some countries and had a disproportion ately negative effect on labour. 
The following six main conclusions emerge:
18 Due to a series break in the data from the Philippines, unemployment rates from 2005 onwards are not directly 
comparable to the earlier series. 
19 No conclusive assessment is possible for the Philippines, where a change in survey methodology led to a series break in 
2005.
20 This disappointment is well summa rized in a recent World Bank report that reviews the growth performance of 
the 1990s: “Contrary to expectations, financial liberalization did not add much to growth, and it appears to have 
augmented the number of crises. As expected, deposits and capital inflows rose sharply as a result of liberalization. 
But, other than in a few East Asian and South Asian coun tries, capital markets did not provide resources for new 
firms. Numbers of stock market list ings declined, even in the newly created markets in the transition countries that 
were sometimes used for privatizations. Also, although relevant time-series data on access are weak, and contrary to 
expectations, it appears that access to financial services did not improve substan tially after liberalization.” (World Bank, 
2005b).
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In the absence of adequate institutions, capital account liberalization has little direct benefit 1. 
for growth. This is especially true for poor countries where the institutional gap is the greatest, 
althought it is also true for middle-income countries where capital inflows were not used to fill 
unmet investment needs.
Even if capital account liberalization is managed prudently, there is a cost to developing coun-2. 
tries. In order to cushion the effects of sudden outflows, developing coun tries have sterilized 
inflows and built up large reserves. Since these are mainly held in low-yield treasury bonds 
issued by industrialized countries, the opportunity cost is large.
Capital account liberalization has left developing countries vulnerable to crises. These are often 3. 
not triggered by a deterioration of a country’s fun damental economic status, but by forces in the 
international financial system. The output losses associated with such crises are large, and even a 
subsequent recovery is usually in sufficient to set a country back on its old growth path.
The negative effects of financial crises on the labour market can be detected in a num ber of 4. 
indicators. Open unemployment typically rises substantially during a crisis, real wages often 
fall, underemployment rises, and work ers shift from the formal sector to agriculture and the 
informal economy.
Labour markets typically lag the economic recovery by several years. Even when GDP per capita 5. 
has reached its pre-crisis level, the consequences of the crisis are normally still evident in higher 
unemployment compared to pre-crisis levels. This lag signifies that labour pays a disproportion-
ate cost.
Tracking the evolution of the labour share in national income also shows that financial open-6. 
ness and financial crises diminish labour’s share. Financial openness is associated with stronger 
bargaining power for capital vis-à-vis labour. Financial crises have a negative and persistent effect 
on the share of labour compensation in GDP.
The effect of the current crisis on labour and possible policy responses
The above analysis of the effects on labour in previous crises provides a useful indicator for an analysis of the 
current crisis, even though information regarding its impact on employment and labour is yet to be fully 
compiled.
The first important point to observe in this context is that the current recession and crisis affect 
developing countries more than previous crises did. The World Bank’s recent Global Economic Prospects 
(2010) argues that the severity of this recession is far more than that of earlier recessions (figure 20). This 
assessment is at variance with earlier evaluations of the effects of the current recession on developing coun-
tries. For example, the IMF World Economic Outlook 2008 argued that greater delinking was taking place 
between industrialized and developing economies, and that developing countries would be less affected by a 
crisis which had started in the developed world. However the decline in trade volumes and values, the sub-
stantial shrinking of FDI, as well as a reversal in the fast-growing trend of increasing remittances, have had 
substantial consequences for developing countries and especially for the poorer segments of their population. 
(See United Nations, 2010; World Bank, 2010).
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Many saw signs of “deglobalization” in the decline of trade, FDI and remittances. One could argue 
that such a deglobalization might be beneficial for developing countries, as it would reduce their exposure 
to the caprices of big players in the global financial and currency markets. Indeed, the current crisis has led 
to the larger developing countries having a somewhat greater influence in economic decision-making. This 
can be seen in the rise to prominence and the increasing importance of the Group of Twenty (G20), which 
is replacing the Group of Seven (G7). However, this is a far cry from the changes in global governance that 
Stiglitz (2009) argues as being necessary to avoid future crises.
Furthermore the decline in trade, FDI and remittances was not the consequence of any agreed 
change in international policies towards globalization. Instead, they are the outcome of the serious downturn 
in GDP in industrialized countries, alongside rising tendencies of protectionism and deterioration of at-
titudes towards foreign workers.
The position of labour in the current crisis is actually extremely worrying. The trends over the last 
two decades (reported above) indicate that the economic bubble generated by financial globalization in the 
second half of the first decade of the twenty first century did not favour most participants in the labour 
market, as low employment elasticities, growing inequality and persistent informalization of labour have 
attested to. Only a small minority has really been profiting from this process. Now that the bubble has burst, 
we notice the consequences to be highly asymmetric. As ILO Global Employment Trends 2010 documents, 
workers are suffering from consequences, and Ravaillion (2009) reports a substantial increase of the number 
of households in poverty as a consequence of the crisis. Also, the lag in employment recovery after a financial 
crisis, which we noticed earlier crises, is proving to be true for this crisis, too. Yet, the executives of financial 
institutions, whose behaviour led to the crisis, continue to get high bonuses and remuneration packages.
Figure 20:  A comparison of downturns in developing countries during several recent recessions
Source: World Bank, Global Economic perspectives 2010.
Note: Change in GDP growth is the percentage change in the growth rate of developing-country GDP between the crisis year(s) and the
previous year. The output gap is the percentage dierence between GDP and potential output during the crisis year(s).
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In brief: the current spate of globalization has made labour more precarious, a trend that has been magni-
fied by the current crisis. This picture is consistent with the policy reaction to the crisis in many countries, where 
Governments have (rightly) acted as a banker of last resort to avoid the collapse of the financial system. But, 
despite stimulus plans, monetary easing and some labour market policies, Governments have not really acted as 
an employer of last resort.
Thus, it seems important to frame policies favouring labour in the current context along the follow-
ing two lines.
First, it is necessary to introduce and strengthen those national and international policies which 
try to undo the trends of precariousness and increasing inequality generated by (financial) globalization. 
Examples of such policies can be found in van der Hoeven and Luebker (2007), United Nations (2007) and 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation (2004).
Second, in addition to the policies above, it is necessary to apply special policies to deal with the 
fallout of the current crisis. Examples of such policies include employment policy schemes (Wray, 2009), 
special labour market policies (Cazes and others, 2009) and cash transfers (Standing, 2007). The costs of 
these policies are often a fraction of the support the financial institutions and large industries have received 
recently. They can be financed initially as part of the current stimulus packages and, once the economy has 
picked up, from increased tax revenues or from reimbursements to the Governments by bailed out financial 
institutions.
It is important to base policy interventions simultaneously on policies dealing with the structural 
problems, which financial globalization has caused, and on policies aimed at assisting those who fall into 
poverty or experience poor working conditions as a consequence of the crisis. The current crisis is clearly the 
outcome of a long-term trend of financial globalization, which, if not arrested in its current form, may well 
lead to a new crisis.
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